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This article considers the ethical dimensions of attempts to ‘personalise’ 
health and social care services in the UK. Personalisation is identified as 
closely related to efforts to introduce elements of neoliberal marketisation into 
public service provision, particularly through the introduction of consumer 
choice for services users. We consider two areas of ethical concern 
surrounding personalisation: its contribution to social justice agendas and the 
enhancement of service users’ autonomy. While personalisation in general, 
and consumer choice in particular, has been presented as positively 
contributing to both social justice and autonomy, we critically revaluate these 
claims. We draw on the work of Nancy Fraser and relational theories of 
autonomy to highlight the ethical complexities of personalisation and the 
potentially negative effects that the extension of consumer choice may have 
on promoting social justice and supporting substantive forms of autonomy. 
We suggest that understanding and negotiating these complexities imposes 
ethical constraints on the ways in which, and extent to which, health and 
social care services can be defensibly personalised.  
 






Personalisation is a key idea driving contemporary reform of public services 
both in the United Kingdom and internationally. Across much of the developed 
world, including Australia, Canada, the USA, and Europe, the principle that 
services ought to become more personalised and sensitive to the demands of 
individual service users has driven innovation within health and social care 
services (Bonfils and Askheim, 2014; European Commission; Gooding, 2016; 
Lord and Hutchinson, 2003; Ungerson and Yeandle, 2007). Advocates of 
personalisation often characterise it not merely as a strategy for creating more 
efficient, higher quality services but also as a means of achieving ethically 
important goals (Mladenov et al 2015). Specifically, personalisation is 
presented as a way of enhancing service users’ autonomy and contributing 
positively to social justice agendas. We examine the ethical credentials of 
personalisation in this paper, using these same two dimensions of ethical 
concern to problematise aspects of, and versions of, the personalisation of 
health and social care services. Whilst accepting that there are many positive 
features of personalisation, we argue that the ethical impact of personalisation 
is more complex than is often suggested by its advocates and that these two 
dimensions should be seen as capable of providing ethical constraints on the 
advocacy for, and implementation of, personalisation.  
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Before we begin, it is worth briefly highlighting what we mean by ‘ethical 
constraints’, especially as it may not be obvious how or why ethical concerns 
could place limits on public policy at all. Perhaps the most prominent type of 
constraints imposed on policy makers seeking to implement reform agendas 
are economic and political. For instance, budgetary limitations may make the 
implementation of certain policy aspirations difficult or impossible. Likewise, 
policy agendas may be stifled by an absence of political will, or from 
insufficient support from governments, institutions, and/or the stakeholders 
responsible for enacting the policy.  
 
Similarly, ethical concerns are a salient factor influencing the policy-making 
process, albeit one that tends to receive relatively less attention. One reason 
for this is because normative considerations can be seen as already 
incorporated into political positions. For instance, liberal politics may be taken 
to inherently presuppose adherence to underlying ethical principles (such as 
respect for property ownership or certain civil liberties) such that there seems 
to be no need for separate recourse to ethical considerations. Alternatively, 
ethical concerns might be relatively neglected where they are considered to 
be so well-established that there is little need to do any serious thinking in this 
area. For example, at least in the current political environment within the UK, 
it is highly unlikely that corporal punishment in schools could be plausibly 
reintroduced primarily because of pervasive beliefs that it is ethically 
unacceptable.  
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There are numerous other clear-cut examples where ethical beliefs are so 
well-established that they set boundaries that limit the nature and scope of 
policy agendas. However, there are many occasions where ethical 
considerations are less ‘visible’ and thus appear to present less of a constraint 
to policy-makers. This may be the case where ethical concerns are obscured 
or marginalized by competing considerations (such as economic or political 
agendas) or because the ethical issues themselves have received relatively 
little, or at least selective, attention and are therefore not well understood. In 
such cases deficits in our understanding do not, of course, indicate that the 
ethical issues are unimportant; rather significant moral transgressions, harms 
or injustices may be at stake.  
 
The personalisation of health and social care services in the UK provides an 
example of a policy agenda where the ethical dimensions of social justice and 
autonomy are relatively poorly understood; and thus after briefly introducing 
‘personalisation’ in the next section, we aim to contribute to the ethical 
scrutiny of personalisation policies. Personalisation is often presented, at least 
within the policy literature, as an unqualified good with positive implications for 
both social justice and the autonomy of service users (Cribb and Owens 2010; 
Leadbeater 2004; HM Government 2011, 2014). By contrast, we argue that 
personalisation, especially when reduced to market-based consumer choice, 
risks negatively impacting on both social justice agendas and the autonomy of 
service users. We regard many personalisation policies as intrinsically related 
to the neoliberal political project of marketisation and seek to show how this 
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relationship potentially undermines respect for social justice and autonomy 
concerns. We suggest that proper attention to these issues highlights ethical 
constraints that alter the nature and scope of the personalisation agenda 
within health and social care services. We thus see our argument as 
contributing to the existing scholarship that critiques the neoliberal 








‘Personalisation’ refers to the process of replacing traditional models of 
centralised, provider-led public services with decentralised, market-based, 
user-led services (Cribb and Owens 2010). Advocates of personalised public 
services often present them as ‘tailoring’ of services so that they are designed 
to fit (or even designed by) their users according to their own specifications 
(Needham and Tizard 2010). Personalised services are thus contrasted with 
old-style ‘one size fits all’ services, where users have to passively take what is 
on offer (HM Government 2014). In contrast to old fashioned ‘top-down’ 
models of service delivery, personalised public services are organised and 
delivered from the ‘bottom-up’ in order to meet the specific needs, desires and 
expectations of individuals (Leadbeater 2004; Mladenov et al 2015).  
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Granting users greater choice over services has been a key means of 
promoting personalisation. The centrality of choice to the reform agenda was 
spelt out explicitly in the Coalition government’s Open Public Services white 
paper: 
 
‘Wherever possible, people should have the power of choice 
about what services they receive... Choice is about empowering 
people. And just as importantly, it’s a crucial lever in improving 
the quality of public service delivery, incentivising providers to 
deliver the services that people want and choose for themselves 
and their families. Choice also recognises that people’s needs 
don’t come in neat bundles. Whether we are talking about an 
older person with dementia or a child in one of the most socio-
economically disadvantaged families in the country, individuals 
have complex sets of needs which inflexible, one-size-fits-all 
public services cannot meet’. (HM Government 2011: 1) 
 
This quotation captures much of which is thought to be valuable about 
personalisation: it is a means of improving quality and (by implication) 
efficiency, creating services that are more sensitive to users’ needs, 
circumstances and expectations, and empowering users by granting them 
more control.  
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Personalisation has been applied across a wide variety of service areas, from 
health and social care and beyond to employment, education and 
rehabilitation (HM Government 2011: 8). As such, personalisation is an elastic 
term, capable of bearing a number of different meanings and strategies (Cribb 
and Owens 2010; Needham 2011; West 2013). It provides an agenda that 
can be realised in more or less radical terms, ranging from granting service 
users greater flexibility and convenience in accessing services to more 
‘disruptive’ changes that redistribute funds and resources directly to service 
users (Leadbeater 2004). For example, since the mid 2000s, outpatients 
requiring care have had the opportunity to choose which hospital they are 
referred to by their GP. This was extended through the introduction of the 
NHS’s Choose and Book service across a range of NHS services (Muir and 
Quilter-Pinner 2015: 13-14), including the ability for patients accessing 
General Practitioner services to register outside of their traditional boundary 
areas. Likewise, in mental health services and elective surgery, patients now 
have the chance to choose who provides their care, as well as its time and 
location. More radically, in England and Wales, personalisation has prompted 
the introduction of ‘personal budgets’ to those entitled to health and social 
care services (Leadbeater 2004; McDonald 2014; Muir and Quilter-Pinner 
2015; NHS England 2014). Personal budgets involve transferring funds to 
those entitled to care, in some cases via a ‘direct’ payment to the beneficiary.  
Recipients can then use these funds to design their own service packages or 
purchase the services they require directly. Personal budgets thus enable 
service users to choose not just the time, place and provider of their services, 
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but also to have greater influence over the aims, means and substantive 
contents of services too.1 
 
As well as being a means of lowering costs and increasing efficiency, 
personalisation has also been presented as a way of attending to ethical 
concerns within the care services. For instance, it has been suggested that 
providing greater choice is a means of putting service users in control of their 
care (Duffy et al 2010; Mladenov et al 2015; Muir and Quilter-Pinner 2015). 
Consequently, personalisation has been billed as a means of moving beyond 
the paternalistic practices associated with the traditional ‘top-down’ service 
model and empowering service users by putting them in decision-making 
roles (McDonald 2014). Advocates of personalisation have thus been able to 
claim that part of the value of personalisation is its potential to enhance both 
social justice and service users’ autonomy. In what follows we will analyse the 
ethical credentials of personalisation in more detail, looking at its potential 
impact first on social justice and then on the autonomy of service users. In so 
doing we will also begin to open up the relationships between these two 
dimensions of ethical concern and to follow up and fill out our suggestion that 
these ethical considerations should provide constraints on the personalisation 
of health and social care services. 
																																																								
1 When discussing personal budgets in the UK context it is important to remember that 
although healthcare is free-at-the-point-of-use, social care is not. This difference is significant 
because users of healthcare services know that the NHS will pay for their care, while social 
care users are used to contributing themselves, both in financial terms, and perhaps also in 
terms of decision-making. A personal budget thus provides healthcare users with choice 
where previously it was absent, while social care users are granted some peace of mind that 
they know what their local authority will pay for concerning at least part of their care needs. 	




Personalisation, marketisation and social justice  
 
The argument that personalisation should be normatively assessed with 
reference to its impact on social justice has been made by a variety of 
academics, critics and campaigners (Duffy 2010; Ferguson, 2012). Iain 
Ferguson (2012: 57) argues that the theory of justice elaborated by Nancy 
Fraser provides a strong theoretical basis for the normative evaluation of 
personalisation. We follow him in using Fraser’s (1995, 1996, 2013) theory of 
justice to examine questions concerning personalisation and its impact on 
economic redistribution and cultural recognition.  
 
According to Fraser’s initial formulation (1995; 1996), social justice ought to 
be understood in relation to both economic and cultural mechanisms rather 
than being reduced to one or the other.  Fraser later (2013) added a third 
dimension to her initially two-dimensional conception of justice – political 
representation. The confines of the present discussion do not allow us to 
expand on the intersection between personalisation and participation in 
democratic deliberation, although we acknowledge its theoretical and practical 
significance in at least two major respects – first, concerning the content of 
personalisation reforms, where specific ‘personalisation technologies’ (Duffy 
2011) have emerged out of collective struggles of service users for inclusion 
in decision-making and where user-led organising has always been an 
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essential condition for the successful personalisation of services (see 
Mladenov 2012); and second, concerning the implementation of 
personalisation reforms, where democratic deficits have been reported as 
jeopardising the whole process (Beresford 2009). Fraser (2005) distinguishes 
three levels of political injustice or ‘misrepresentation’: (i) ordinary-political 
misrepresentation – when members of a political community are denied full 
participation in deliberation and decision-making concerning policies of 
redistribution and recognition that affect them; (ii) misframing – when affected 
people are denied membership in the political community that deliberates and 
makes decisions about redistribution and recognition; and (iii) meta-political 
misrepresentation – when affected people are excluded from processes of 
frame-setting, i.e., from deliberation and decision-making that determines the 
criteria for political membership. Beresford (2009: 2) has observed that 
‘service users and their organisations generally feel they have had little say in 
[personalisation’s] shaping or development’, and that ‘face-to-face 
practitioners… are at best anxious about “personalisation”, and at worst see it 
as another top-down policy to restrict their practice and independence’. These 
observations link personalisation to ordinary-political misrepresentation 
because those most affected by the reform (i.e., service users and 
practitioners providing services) have been denied full participation or 
effective ‘voice’ in deliberations and decision-making concerning 
personalisation policy. With this preliminary consideration in mind, we now 
turn towards Fraser’s originally ‘bivalent’ theory of justice in order to apply it to 
personalisation. 
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As suggested above, developing an understanding of the ‘real world’ impact 
that personalisation has for social justice will require a closer look at 
neoliberal processes of marketisation of public provision and the general 
‘rolling back’ of the welfare state. In addition, the context of post-2008 
austerity has created an increasingly pressing need to consider distributive 
issues when evaluating strategies for public sector reform. 
 
From the perspective of redistribution, Fraser suggests that socioeconomic 
mechanisms that (re)produce exploitation, economic marginalisation and 
material deprivation are socially unjust (Fraser 1996: 7). Accordingly, social 
justice requires economic equality and demands measures that span from 
surface-level, affirmative interventions (for example, actions which improve 
pay and benefits), to deep-level, transformative interventions across society 
(for example, actions that alter the relations of production or the division of 
labour). Reforms of welfare programmes, although usually regarded as 
affirmative rather than transformative, may also be effective in the second, 
more profound sense. For example, Fraser (Fraser and Honneth 2003: 78) 
considers Unconditional Basic Income as a social security scheme that could 
potentially have far-reaching structural effects, including shifts in the ‘balance 
of power between capital and labor’ and decommodification of labour. As we 
will see, similar considerations apply to personalisation, where a reform of the 
principles of allocation of public funding for social support is summoned to 
alter the balance of power between service users and providers. 
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From the perspective of recognition, Fraser suggests that social injustice is 
generated by cultural mechanisms that (re)produce forms of cultural 
domination, non-recognition and disrespect (1996: 7). Accordingly, social 
justice requires status equality that could be pursued by interventions on 
different levels – from upward revaluation of previously disparaged or 
disregarded differences, through recognition of erased or undermined 
commonalities, to deconstruction of the key terms in which differences are 
articulated. Within her conceptualisation of social justice Fraser proposes a 
‘status model’ of recognition, according to which misrecognition is understood 
as a cause of injustice insofar as it impairs the social standing of people and 
prevents them from participating fully in public life. This consideration 
suggests that in our assessment of personalisation’s impact on social justice 
we should focus on its impact on people’s status as participants in social life. 
 
Fraser’s two-dimensional framework implies that personalisation’s potential 
for contributing towards social justice depends on its ability to bring together 
redistribution and recognition in ways that, first, guarantee the economic 
resources needed by service users for equal participation in social life (thus 
satisfying concerns about redistribution), and second, institutionalise patterns 
of cultural interpretation that equalise the status of service users in social 
interaction (thus satisfying the principle of recognition). 
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Historically, public services characteristic of the welfare-state capitalism of the 
1950s and 1960s failed to secure the autonomy of the users due to their 
failure to wed redistribution with recognition. Here we see the way in which a 
concern to address social justice can coincide with a concern to promote 
service users’ autonomy. In the UK at least, enhanced redistribution ensured 
that people gained improved access to healthcare, social care, social security, 
and education. Yet public services were organised and provided in such ways 
that deprived their users of ‘voice’ and undermined their status: although 
widely accessible, ‘one size fits all’ solutions (e.g., residential institutions for 
social care) dominated by over-powerful experts (e.g., medical professionals) 
created deficits in terms of service users’ autonomy (Evans 2002; Morris 
2011).   
 
It was in response to such restrictions of autonomy and voice that social 
movements such as the Independent Living movement emerged in the 1970s 
(Evans 2002). Independent Living advocates demanded a greater say in the 
care they received, campaigning for the deinstitutionalisation of public 
services through mechanisms such as direct payments that work by 
transferring funds directly to the users in order to enable them to have full 
control over their assistance. Direct payments schemes have been regarded 
as bringing about empowerment and emancipation to their recipients because 
through them disabled people become ‘employers/contractors’ (Stainton and 
Boice 2004: 443) who either directly recruit, hire and manage their personal 
assistants or do so through the mediation of independent service providers 
What Justice, What Autonomy?	
	 15	
(agencies). Prominent campaigners have argued that the mechanism is 
supposed to create a market where providers and other support structures 
compete among themselves in order to attract the users who now sovereignly 
wield the purchasing power (Ratzka 2004). 
 
Direct payments have been a key member of a family of innovative 
mechanisms for enhancing users’ autonomy that emerged more or less 
simultaneously and included peer support, individual/personal budgets, 
person-centred planning, supported employment and supported living (Duffy 
2011). These mechanisms were subsumed in the 2000s under the general 
heading of ‘personalisation’ (Leadbeater 2004; Duffy 2010, 2011). 
Personalisation was thus able to be presented as an overarching strategy for 
providing autonomy that had been denied to services users by the institutions 
of the welfare state. As Duffy describes:  
 
‘personalisation is the fruit of the long-standing effort of disabled 
people, and many other excluded groups, together with their 
allies, to achieve social justice from within a broken welfare 
system’ (2011: 11).  
 
We suggest that the scope for personalisation reform to undermine economic 
redistribution has been covered up by the emphasis it places on a 
consumerist version of recognition. Our argument hinges on understanding 
the place of personalisation within wider agenda to reform the welfare state in 
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line with the neoliberal processes of radical marketisation and the ‘rolling back’ 
of the state. In a previous paper (Mladenov et al 2015) we regarded 
personalisation as encompassing two aspects – marketisation and social 
justice, and characterised the former as tending to overshadow the latter, 
especially in the context of post-2008 austerity in the UK. We argued that the 
ways in which personalisation seeks to undermine paternalism by recruiting 
market mechanisms ‘risks disregarding the structures that support individual 
autonomy, commodifying important norms and relationships, overvaluing 
economic efficiency, and privileging those who are already empowered’ 
(Mladenov et al 2015: 11). In the remainder of this section, we elaborate on 
these claims by using Fraser’s bivalent theory of social justice to consider the 
extent to which an overemphasis on consumerist recognition masks the 
potential of personalisation reforms to undermine redistribution. 
 
Personalisation might be thought to contribute to both dimensions if it is taken 
to be concerned with improving the extant mechanisms of redistribution in 
order to redress misrecognition. In its ‘deep’ forms (Leadbeater 2004) 
epitomised by direct payments and personal budgets, the strategy amounts to 
redirecting public funds from institutionalised care to user-led support that is 
expected to enhance the autonomy of users and their status within 
interactions with services providers and professionals by providing the users 
with the prospect of exercising greater influence in decision-making processes. 
Providing service users with more opportunities for ‘choice and control’ over 
processes of procurement, delivery and evaluation, including over the content 
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of services, creates possibilities for service users to participate as peers in the 
wider cultural and economic life of their communities as well. For example, by 
providing disabled people with control over the nature and timing of their 
personal assistance, direct payments enable users to (re)engage in gainful 
employment, which could alleviate their economic marginalisation and 
decrease their material deprivation, redressing two of the instances of 
maldistribution highlighted by Fraser (1996: 7).   
 
However, a more detailed analysis of the wider context in which 
personalisation is implemented reveals problems with regards to distributive 
justice. Currently in the UK, the allocation of personalised funding for social 
support through personal budgets (that could then be taken either as direct 
payments or as services in kind) is determined through a process that utilises 
a combination of preliminary ‘upfront allocation’ and subsequent actual 
allocation achieved through needs assessment and support planning 
(Slasberg, Beresford and Schofield 2012). The idea is that potential users will 
be in a better position to articulate and negotiate their needs during the 
support planning if they know in advance, through an indicative upfront 
allocation, how much money they will get for covering their social support 
expenses. Yet critics have argued that the indicative component of the 
process is redundant and misleading because in majority of the cases, the 
actual budgets are significantly smaller than the indicative ones (Slasberg, 
Beresford and Schofield 2012, 2013). In addition, the system for upfront 
allocation, being extremely complex and bureaucratised, tends to 
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disempowers users (Slasberg, Beresford and Schofield 2012, 2013). In 2012, 
Simon Duffy, the chief architect and promoter of this mechanism, issued a 
public apology in which he described the extant system as a ‘disaster area’, 
noting that the problems brought about by it were ‘further accelerated in 2010, 
as the new government imposed its 25% cut on social care, and as authorities 
began to use any tool possible to make these unfair cuts’ (Duffy 2012: n.p.). In 
this way, personalisation can be viewed as an effective means of masking the 
realities of the diminishing allocation of resources being directed towards 
users of health and social care services.  
 
As far as recognition is concerned, personalisation promises to enhance the 
status of service users as equal partners in social interaction by valorising the 
users’ perspectives that have traditionally been submerged under the 
perspectives of welfare experts. And yet, personalisation’s upward revaluation 
of users’ perspectives is not straightforward, and it seems unlikely that its 
complexity can be fully accounted for within the narrow discourse of 
consumerism – the emphasis on turning service users into consumers of 
services whose preferences can then be satisfied through market transactions 
tends to promote a limited version of recognition. For example, simply 
granting a person with one or more long-term chronic health conditions 
greater choice over who provides the clinical support she is entitled to would, 
on its own, appear to do very little to actually recognise her perspective on her 
illness or to properly respect her beliefs about what form the treatment ought 
to take. As Mol (2008) suggests, a more substantive engagement with 
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patients’ beliefs and values requires the development of longstanding, caring 
relationships between patients and professionals, a measure that the 
imposition of market mechanisms promoting consumer choice can impede 
(see also Owens 2012). 
 
Without additional provision of peer support, personalisation tends to favour 
people who already enjoy relatively high social standing due to their privileged 
positions along intersecting axes of difference including class, gender and 
ethnicity. In healthcare, the ‘inverse care law’ (Tudor Hart 1971) suggests that 
the patients with least resources are likely to benefit least from personalised 
provision (Mladenov et al 2015: 11; Boyle 2013). Similarly, in disability policy, 
the advantages offered by direct payments and personal budgets have been 
more readily available to the more educated and articulate middle-class users 
(Slasberg et al 2013: 101; Ferguson 2007: 398). As Beresford has suggested 
(Beresford and Stansfield 2013), such inequalities present a challenge to 
government to provide additional redistributive mechanisms necessary for 
ensuring the level of peer and other additional support required by the users 
of personalised services for successful equalisation of their status in social 
interaction.  
 
Concerns about potentially negative implications for social justice should 
constrain the scope and course of personalisation reforms. Advocates of 
personalisation must be ready to measure their hopes against both broadly 
based theoretical accounts of social justice and challenges arising from the 
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operationalisation of conceptions of justice in practical contexts, given that the 
latter are frequently shaped by other values and imperatives. At least they 
must be able to respond to the twin challenges of economic redistribution and 
cultural recognition: To address the distributive dimension of justice, 
personalisation must support (rather than undermine) a wider vision of, and 
strategy for, redressing maldistribution. Similarly, to address cultural injustice, 
mechanisms of support that exceed the narrow understanding of autonomy as 
‘consumer choice’ are needed. We shall develop this argument about the 
limits and burdens of choice further in the next section which focuses 
expressly on the autonomy and empowerment of service users. 
 
 
Personalisation, autonomy and empowerment  
 
Concerns about the contribution of personalisation to social justice are closely 
related to overlapping questions about its potentially negative impact on the 
autonomy of service users. As with social justice it is important to recognise 
that ‘autonomy’ can be approached through different conceptions and with 
emphases placed on different facets; for example, as we will shortly come on 
to illustrate, an important distinction can be drawn between autonomy in 
relation to decisions and autonomy in relation to action more broadly 
construed. A core consideration here is the way in which autonomy is 
frequently narrowly constructed within the literature as being constituted by 
extended opportunities for individual services users to exercise ‘choice and 
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voice’ (Mladenov et al 2015).2 This is well illustrated by McDonald’s 
characterisation of the autonomous users of personalised healthcare services 
as having the means to ‘influence and control decisions that affect them’ and 
of empowered patients as having their ‘views heard, through the choices they 
make and the feedback they give’ (2014: 12-13). We are concerned that the 
pervasive ideas and influences of neoliberalism – particularly its core 
commitment to promoting forms of market-based choice for individuals – have 
led to a hollowing out of autonomy and empowerment within policy discourses 
and practices of personalisation in ways that may limit the potential for service 
users to actually achieve valuable goals.  
 
We should make clear at this point that we agree that additional recognition 
and respect for the choice and voice of service users does have the potential 
to deliver significant benefits. This will be particularly true where 
personalisation enables service users to gain the sort of status-enhancing 
recognition outlined above with reference to Fraser’s theory of social justice. 
However, we question the extent to which the mechanisms of feedback and 
consumer choice can actually deliver meaningful and substantive forms of 
autonomy. Here we have in mind two broad areas of concern – first, the 
concern that implementing ‘more (consumer) choice’ as a means of promoting 
autonomy carries risks as well as benefits; and second, the concern that this 																																																								
2 The characterisation of ‘choice and voice’ in much of the policy literature is based upon a 
consumerist motif that either explicitly refers to or implies an atomistic, self-maximising and 
calculative behaviour on the part of individual services users. This formulation bears little 
resemblance to more profound, collectively sustained forms of ‘choice and voice’ that have 
been envisioned by the campaigners for user autonomy (for example, within the disabled 
people’s movement) in their critique of old-style welfare-state institutions (see Roulstone and 
Morgan 2009).	
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conception of autonomy is inherently limited in ethically important respects. 
We will discuss each of these in turn. 
                     
Firstly, consideration of personal budgets highlights some potential problems 
with providing service users with greater consumer choice. Framing autonomy 
in terms of health and/or social care service users managing a personal 
budget will not be appropriate if people either do not wish to take up a 
personal budget, or if they lack the additional support (e.g. peer support) 
needed to effectively cope with the demands of managing a personal budget. 
Though personal budgets are presented as optional, many service users may 
feel that there is an expectation that they take this option. This may result in 
‘enforced individualism’ as a substitute for the ‘enforced collectivity’ of 
traditional provision (Lloyd, 2010; Roulstone and Morgan 2009). For example, 
service users may feel pressured to accept a personal budget if, whether in 
conversation with service providers or through exposure to the policy literature, 
they detect an inherent normative presumption in favour of personal budgets 
and against traditional methods. In many contexts, it may be hard to resist the 
presumption that services users ought to be engaged in the processes of 
planning, procuring and evaluating their care because they will be empowered 
if they do so. This pressure may be compounded if services users feel that by 
not accepting a personal budget they would be failing to meet the conduct and 
expectations required of an ‘empowered’ and ‘autonomous’ service user. 
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Should service users take up a personal budget where this is against their 
wishes any associated gains to their autonomy will be accompanied by the 
added anxieties it generates. This burden may be faced more generally by all 
recipients of personal budgets who are made responsible for planning and 
procuring their care and managing the entailed financial and legal obligations. 
As Schwartz (2005) argues, choosing is frequently accompanied by 
considerable anxieties, and it is often the case that living with the 
consequences of our choices means facing an added burden of responsibility, 
especially if users feel they have been ‘abandoned’ to their choice by those 
who formerly provided their care (Calne et al 2009; Loewy 2005: 445). While 
many services users may be happy to live with these extra responsibilities, it 
should not be assumed that providing opportunities for service users to make 
choices and engage in decision-making processes can be delivered without 
potential sacrifices. Risk of harm may be particularly acute for service users 
who either decide not to take up a personal budget or lack the additional 
support to do so if their only alternative is to accept top-down and paternalistic 
forms of care. As Marion Barnes notes, ‘“Care and protection” is the booby 
prize if people can’t exercise “choice and control”’ (2011: 160). This 
proposition grows increasingly alarming if a combination of market-based 
competition and austerity leads to a significant reduction in available care 
services.3 In such cases there is a danger that constructing the autonomous 
and empowered service user as the manager of a personal budget will 																																																								
3 One consequence of introducing a competitive market model that diverts funding directly to 
service users is that more or less ‘traditional’ health and social care services may face 
reduction or closure if they prove ‘unpopular’ with holders of personal budgets and in times of 
austerity such services may not be replaced by alternative forms of support. 
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exclude those who either cannot or will not take on this role, and in so doing 
fail to respect and respond to other forms of autonomous expression.  
 
Secondly, we question the extent to which providing individuals with greater 
consumer choice and voice actually delivers autonomy in a meaningful sense. 
This argument is based on two concerns: i) personalisation is often 
accompanied by measures that seek to influence service users’ choices; ii) 
providing service users with market-based choice is not sufficient for 
delivering autonomy and empowering people in the way that is suggested 
within the literature which promotes personalisation.  
 
To take the former point, the personalisation agenda has often been 
accompanied by the introduction of measures that seek to bring service users’ 
decisions into line with the agendas of policy makers and services providers. 
While personalisation has generally sought to replace policies and practices 
which exert ‘hard power’ directly on service users with measures that 
encourage them to engage in decision-making, this has been accompanied by 
an increasing use of what Joseph Nye has described as ‘soft co-optive’ forms 
of power (1990: 167). For instance, public health strategy in the UK has 
recently shifted away from enacting structural, top-down strategies in favour of 
strategies that seek to promote healthier decision-making amongst the public 
through encouraging us to make healthier choices and adopt forms of 
behaviour change. In 2010 the Behavioural Insights Team was set up by the 
UK government in order to find ways of ‘enabling people to make better 
What Justice, What Autonomy?	
	 25	
choices for themselves and society’ (HM Government 2011: 9). At the same 
time we have seen the emergence of ‘nudge’ strategies that involve creating 
environmental conditions that seek to influence the decisions that people 
make (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). So-called ‘choice architecture’ approaches 
supply policy-makers and service providers with a covert means of ‘nudging’ 
service users into making choices that align with their own agendas. Using 
behavioural psychology with the precise intent of shaping the choices and 
decisions of service users undermines claims that providing greater choice is 
a means of respecting service users’ autonomy and delivering genuine 
empowerment.  
 
The latter point is based on more fundamental doubts that introducing greater 
choice and voice will actually put services users in the position of autonomy in 
the way that is often suggested. The rhetoric promoting personalisation 
derives much of its moral and political appeal from the suggestion that 
providing services users with choices will grant them the freedom to act and 
achieve valuable outcomes. Yet, however valuable the choices offered to 
service users may be, providing users with opportunities to engage in 
evaluation and decision-making does not necessarily mean that service users 
will be in a position to act on these decisions and achieve the object of their 
choices.4 For example, taking up a personal budget for social care needs may 
enable a person to choose who provides their care services as well as the 																																																								
4 This argument is based on a distinction that can be drawn between the capacity for 
autonomous deliberation and the capacity for autonomous action, a distinction that is routinely 
ignored by those who suggest that greater choice will deliver substantive autonomy to service 
users (see Owens and Cribb 2013). 	
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goals that these services are directed towards, but they may remain incapable 
of not only actually achieving these goals but also of meaningfully pursuing 
them because of circumstantial factors which fall outside the scope of their 
choice-making. This may be especially true of services users who occupy 
positions of significant material, socio-cultural, political and/or economic 
disadvantage.  
 
This argument amounts to the claim that advocates of personalisation need to 
understand autonomy in relational terms. Relational theorists describe a 
person’s freedom to deliberate and act as partially dependent on the myriad 
material and social relationships in which they are situated (Clifford 2013; 
Mackenzie and Stoljar 2000; Owens and Cribb 2013). Before concluding we 
can briefly sketch two illustrative examples of the way in which a relational 
understanding of autonomy is important for understanding personalisation. 
These indicate, in a way that both interlinks with and parallels the points made 
about social justice, the broad base of normative considerations which are 
relevant to evaluating the impacts of personalisation and, more substantively, 
the wider social conditions that need to be in place if policies are to actually, 
and not just rhetorically, serve the ends of social justice and personal 
autonomy. 
 
First, even with personalised support, most disabled people would still be 
employed in low-paying, precarious jobs in the absence of high-paying and 
secure employment opportunities and ‘reasonable accommodation’ 
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arrangements for disabled employees (on the employment problems 
experienced by disabled people under conditions of contemporary capitalism 
see Russell, 2002). This highlights the limitations of approaches to autonomy 
that focus narrowly on providing individuals with choice and ignore the wider 
structural circumstances in which individuals make choices (Owens and Cribb, 
2013). We suggest that if personalisation is to genuinely enable services 
users to act on their decisions and achieve their goals it needs to be 
integrated into broader strategies for reforming the structural conditions in 
which service users are positioned (in the case of disability this could include 
reforms to the labour market, the accessibility of public infrastructure, socio-
cultural attitudes towards disability, the presence of supportive personal and 
professional relationships, etc.). This critique is particularly important given 
the propensity for reforms based on personalisation to allow concerns with the 
private to eclipse the public, reducing or even closing the services, facilities 
and public institutions that support and maintain permissive structural 
conditions across society. Moreover, it is doubly important in times of austerity, 
when cuts in public services threaten to reduce personalisation to a cost-
saving instrument that legitimises maldistribution instead of redressing it 
(Ferguson 2012; Needham 2011). 
 
Secondly, it is also important to recognise the impact that specific practices of 
personalisation may have on the relationships and interactions between 
service providers and service users, including the potential for negative, as 
well as positive, effects on the autonomy of both groups. In many instances 
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the opportunities open to service users to decide and act freely will depend on 
the breadth of possibilities that service providers themselves have to decide 
and act. Service providers clearly have to adapt to new roles and relationships 
to fully embrace and enact personalisation, but they are themselves 
positioned within structural conditions that shape the possibilities of 
adaptation and personalisation. Regimes of increasing managerialism and 
ever tighter auditing and accountability frameworks which have accompanied 
the personalisation agenda have squeezed the autonomy of health and social 
care professionals, affecting their practice and the freedom they have to 
interact with patients (Clarke and Newman 1997; Cribb 2008; Department of 
Health 2008). In this context the welcome recognition of, and respect for, the 
expertise and judgment of patients has the potential to further limit the 
potentially open-ended caring and advising roles of healthcare professionals, 
replacing them with needlessly circumscribed roles directed towards 
managing care-plans, acting as a gate-keeper of resources and/or a facilitator 
of patients choices (Glendinning et al, 2015; Mladenov et al 2015; Mol 2008; 
Owens 2012). If, for instance, GPs feel less able to freely interact with their 
patients because they are required to meet a set of performance indicators 
and work towards a specified set of outcomes, or because they work in a 
normative climate that equates all expressions of opinion, however supportive 
or skilfully accomplished, with an imposition of values on patients, this may 
end up restricting the quality and freedom of clinical relationships. If 
personalisation is to be realised in practice the autonomy of service providers 
may sometimes need to be moderated to enable greater autonomy for service 
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users; but there need be no assumption that autonomy gains for users must 
equate to autonomy losses for providers. Indeed the benefits that 
personalisation can bring to service users will depend upon addressing and 





Personalisation has the potential to deliver significant benefits to users of 
health and social care services, but in this paper we have argued that the 
ethics of personalisation is more complicated than it is often suggested. Whilst 
advocates of personalisation are right to place emphasis on the promotion of 
social justice and service user autonomy as ethically relevant considerations, 
we have suggested that these considerations point in more than one direction. 
These complexities arise, as we have shown, both because of the need to 
theoretically ‘unpack’ the values of social justice and autonomy into different 
conceptions and aspects, and because of the move from an abstract ‘in 
principle’ defence of personalisation to a real world enactment of 
personalisation policies that often assume marketised and consumerist forms. 
We argue that understanding and negotiating these complexities imposes 
ethical constraints on the ways and extent to which health and social care 
services can be defensibly personalised.  
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Further research that illuminates the ethical impact of personalisation for 
users and providers of public services is needed, especially as more radical 
forms of personalisation are introduced and as the spending constraints of 
austerity cut deeper. We suggest that Nancy Fraser’s approach to social 
justice is an invaluable tool for such research, providing a platform for 
considering the impact of personalisation on economic distribution and 
cultural recognition across society and the potential effects in terms of 
inequality and disadvantage. Likewise, relational approaches to autonomy, 
which help to highlight the gulf between shallow choice-making options and 
the underlying social conditions needed for autonomous action, will be 
invaluable for generating critical understanding of the various positive and 
negative implications that personalisation has for the autonomy of service 
users. These perspectives, and the ethical challenges they reveal, provide an 
opportunity to cut through the rhetoric surrounding personalisation and to 
motivate both more theoretically informed and more grounded evaluations of 
the potential benefits and harms of the proposed reforms. 
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